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Abstract
Through examination of literature, statistical analysis, and field research in Dakar,
Senegal, this study explores the economic implications of an expanding Chinese presence
on Senegalese retailers in the informal market of Dakar, and on Senegalese consumers of
cheap goods that shop primarily in this market. Since the early 1990s, a neighborhood of
Chinese storefronts selling cheap goods has developed in the Centenaire region of
downtown Dakar. The Chinese entrepreneurs, primarily in Dakar for wholesale, have
adapted to the demands of low-end Senegalese retailers and consumers, focusing their
products on basic necessities, such as clothing, and imitation commodities, such as
Islamic prayer beads. They are able to mass-manufacture these good in China under
cheaper production costs than the Senegalese face, allowing Chinese traders to provide
locally at lower cost the same goods Senegalese entrepreneurs used to have to travel to
China to purchase. Contemporary literature suggests that, while democratizing
consumption for low-income shoppers, the rock bottom prices Chinese merchants offer
trigger competition between Chinese and Senegalese retailers that puts many Senegalese
retailers out of business. Field research, however, contradicts these conclusions and
removes the secondhand biases and inaccuracies common in the literature. Instead,
firsthand research proved the Chinese presence leads to a rise in the standard of living
and employment opportunities in Dakar. Thus, despite contemporary literature that
argues otherwise, the gains from the Chinese presence in the informal market of Dakar,
Senegal outweigh the losses for Senegalese consumers and retailers alike.1
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The term “China” is used in this thesis to designate the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Republic
of China in Taiwan is referred to as “Taiwan.”
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1. Introduction
Why Explore China in Senegal?
China’s economy has grown exponentially since market-oriented reforms were
first initiated in 1978, and is now the world’s fastest-growing major economy. Since the
1990s, China has invested significantly in the African continent to gain access to raw
materials and new markets, to exert political influence. As investments and development
aid become more extensive throughout the continent, the global controversy over China’s
intentions is intensifying.2
Senegal, however, is a bit of an anomaly among African nations. While China’s
fundamental purpose in Africa is to mine natural resources that feed China’s domestic
manufacturing and export economy, Senegal has no such natural resources. Senegal is
also a well-established, stable democracy whose political interests are pointed to the
West, not towards communist East-Asian China. Senegal’s relations with China are
therefore inconsistent with other African nations, and yet are more extensive than most,
with the Senegalese government inviting large Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
such as China Henan and Huawei, to invest millions in infrastructure projects.
Why Chinese Merchants?
As China’s economic presence in Africa expands, so does the Chinese community
living in Africa, from officials, such as embassy staff and heads of SOEs, to the labor
force of major infrastructure projects. But within the past decade a new group has
emerged completely independent of official Chinese government activity: that of Chinese
traders and small business owners. Senegal’s informal market is its largest employer,

2

Shinn and Brown “China and Africa: A Century of Engagement.” Chatham House June 29 (2012): 1-10.
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providing jobs to 61% of Senegal’s urban population. It protects against the absolute
lowest levels of poverty in providing small income to individuals that cannot enter the
formal market. When observing the informal market, which employs and provides goods
to a majority of Dakar’s inhabitants, these Chinese wholesale traders and small
entrepreneurs have the biggest impact on the Senegalese economy.3
Chinese wholesalers congregate along the Boulevard du General de Gaulle in the
Centenaire region, where they sell basic necessities and imitation goods in bulk primarily
to Senegalese retailers. This has led to an expansion of employment opportunities for
undereducated Senegalese entrepreneurs within the informal market and to the variety of
commodities sold within it. Importantly, these migrants have limited connections to
broader Chinese interests and activities within Senegal, and their economic implications
differ in scale relative to those outlined in contemporary literature sources. This research
provides a unique angle on Chinese presence in Dakar and expands the literature on this
subject.

3

Malia Politzer “China and Africa: Stronger Economic Ties Mean More Migration.” Migration
Information Source Aug. 2008, Feature Story: 1-5.
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2. Literature Review: Conceptual Basis for Study
Within the past decade there has been considerable research conducted by
political scientists, anthropologists, and scholars regarding China’s penetration of Africa.
A rich variety of sources published in North America, Europe and Africa, provide
exposure to a diverse range of perspectives on the topic. The research can be consolidated
into four main themes: China-Africa relations, China-Senegal relations, Chinese in
Dakar, and Senegal’s informal economy. Each piece contributes to the framework for
analysis of the expanding presence of Chinese merchants in Dakar. The framework
demonstrates why the relationship is likely to be a disadvantage for Senegalese traders
within the informal market of the local economy, while benefitting low-income
Senegalese consumers that frequent this market. Researchers conclude that the
importance of the informal market in providing employment to the economically
disenfranchised, in a country where unemployment has hovered around fifty percent for
decades, suggests that ultimately the Chinese merchants’ presence in Dakar, Senegal is
more detrimental to Dakar than beneficial. Ultimately my own field research contradicts
this notion, and instead suggests that Chinese wholesalers boost employment for
marginalized populations in Dakar while democratizing consumption for low-income
customers.
To begin with the literature, it is important to recognize China’s growing relations
with Africa in general to understand the ultimate implications specifically relating to
Senegal. As Gehrold and Tietze (2011) articulate, China first established relations with
six African nations in the Bandung Asian-African Conference of 1955. With the death of
Mao Zedong in 1976, new policies opening and liberalizing China’s economy were

Hurst

3

enforced, laying the foundation for China’s robust economic growth. The 1989
Tiananmen Square Massacre,4 however, destroyed Western hopes for China’s political
liberalization, and resulted in widespread efforts to isolate China from Western industrial
nations. During the Cold War era, it was pertinent the West advocate for and support
democracy over communism, thus the West purposely marginalized many autocratic
African nations. These African states instead showed solidarity with a financially
generous communist China, thus convincing China to prioritize Africa in foreign policy
and to redirect substantial development aid to the continent. African countries also
provided new markets critical in stabilizing China’s economy after the 1997 Asian
financial crisis. This level of interdependency between China and the African continent
was founded on the basis of mutual benefit and financial security.
Chris Alden (2009) outlines three interpretations of China’s role in Africa today.
First, China is seen as a long-term economic and development partner dedicated to
sharing its technical expertise on solving developmental challenges. China’s involvement
enables African countries to diversify and broaden their development trajectories,
economic links, and global partnerships.
But, Alden continues, China’s endeavors are not entirely altruistic. China is also
seen as an economic competitor with short-term interests in grabbing resources for
domestic growth, and thus completely disregarding long-term local environmental and
developmental needs, concerns and impacts in Africa. African development gains are
challenged by Chinese competitiveness, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.
4

The Tiananmen Square Incident: government crackdown on a series of protests for economic and political
reform in Beijing on the night of June 3-4, 1989. Tanks and heavily armed troops opened fire on and
crushed demonstrators that got in the way. "Tiananmen Square Incident." Encyclopædia Britannica. 1-4.
Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Web. 15 Nov. 2012.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/594820/Tiananmen-Square-incident>.
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Lastly, China is regarded by some as a colonizer, seeking long-term political
allies to displace Africa’s traditional Western orientation through partnerships with local
elites. It stresses South-South solidarity but ultimately, critics claim, China is seeking
political control over Africa. Field research in Dakar defeats this notion of
neocolonialism disseminated by Western sources.
China actively engages in a policy of non-interference. In general, China’s
development assistance is not conditional or based on principles of good governance, like
many Western countries that require recipient nations to achieve economic or political
improvement benchmarks before awarding the next development loan. Instead, China
provides blind assistance on the agreement of the recipient nation not to recognize
Taiwan in accordance with the One China Policy.5 It is also suggested that China
provides development assistance in exchange for access to natural resources often
controlled by African governments corrupted by this resource wealth.
Today, the Chinese government heralds its policy of non-interference as
exceptional, granting African nations equal access to foreign investment, capital, and
development assets, regardless of their ideology or execution of internationally
denounced behavior, such as genocide. China effectively leads in securing multilateral
ties with the African continent, establishing South-South relations and a strong network
of allies, political and otherwise. Each power profits from technological expertise and
skill transfers as well as greater access to resources necessary for growth.
Despite the seemingly unhampered flow of aid to Africa, the Chinese
government’s methods have certain setbacks, Gehrold and Tietze (2011) continue.

5

Gehrold, Stefan, and Lena Tietze. Far From Altruistic: China's Presence in Senegal. KAS, 2011. Print.
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Various Chinese government bodies are required to approve development assistance
initiatives, making the process complex, opaque, and inefficient. Chinese initiatives also
strive to enhance China’s reputation through prestige projects and in cultivating good will
by constructing public buildings, fighting disease, and improving infrastructure.6 While
African governments benefit from growth and technological transfer, Chinese motives in
advancing its stature suggests Chinese aid is not fully altruistic. Western media and
literature often take this exploitation of African resources and dependence vulnerabilities
as neo-colonialism.
Given this analysis of China’s history and motives in broader Africa, it is
informative to investigate Senegal’s localized position within the broader China-Africa
framework. Similar to other African nations, Hazard et al (2009) argue that Senegalese
goods struggle to enter the Chinese market, demonstrated by the fact that only 0.5% of
Senegalese exports head to China. There is a marked trade disequilibrium as a result, with
Senegal importing considerably more from China than China imports from Senegal.
But uniquely, natural resources in Senegal are nearly non-existent, with negligible
amounts of gold and oil, and an already over-exploited fishing industry. Therefore,
Senegal serves little purpose as an export market to China. Senegal could sink into
economic bankruptcy in the near future given the government’s acceptance of Chinese
loans, and Senegal’s lack of natural resources as a source of consistent and available
income used to repay loans. Among the most notable of China’s lending is the $55
million loan in 2009 from the Chinese Export-Import (Exim) Bank targeting the
expansion of the electricity supply network in Dakar.

6
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As Chinese loans to Senegal increase overtime, and Senegal’s minimal resource
supply becomes depleted due to overuse by local producers, the threat of getting caught
in a debt trap jeopardizes Senegal’s economic integrity. Shinn and Brown (2012) expose
this reality in stating “The Chinese impact on Africa is sustainable as long as African
countries can repay the loan… If they do not have access to raw material, it is more
difficult for the country to get out of the debt trap.”7 Because Senegal does not have raw
materials and has trouble accessing the Chinese market, Senegal’s ability to export
commodities to pay for future obligations is limited. China’s increasing presence
threatens to undermine Senegal’s economic growth and stability.
Another important theme in the academic sources is the history of ChineseSenegalese diplomatic relations since Senegal’s independence from France in 1960.
Hazard et al (2009) lay out the inconsistent history, based largely on economic
preconditions and the One China Policy. Under Senegal’s first president, Léopold Sédar
Senghor (1960-1980), Senegal recognized the communist People’s Republic of China
(PRC) over democratic Taiwan, but it was in second President Abdou Diouf’s best
interest to shift diplomatic relations from the PRC to Taiwan in 1996. First, it reflected
Senegal’s solidification as the most stable, democratic state in West Africa and thus it
was in its diplomatic best interest to recognize another strong democracy over a
communist state. The transition was also based on the notion of checkbook diplomacy in
which Taiwan provided significant financial backing to states that officially recognized
its sovereignty over the PRC. Taiwan bestowed large funds that were not tied to specific
development projects, allowing tremendous investment flexibility for Senegal.
7

Shinn, David, Ambassador, and Kerry Brown, Dr. "China and Africa: A Century of Engagement."
Chatham House June.29 (2012): 8. Print.
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Ultimately, however, these funds were no longer sufficient to justify ignoring the PRC’s
economic omnipresence on the global stage. In 2005, President Abdoulaye Wade shifted
diplomacy back to the PRC to reap the benefits of partnering with the world’s fastest
growing economy.
According to Dittgen (2010), these changes in diplomacy and economic alliances
link directly to the growing presence of Chinese migrants in Senegal as a result of
increased economic ties between the two countries. The Chinese government required the
Senegalese government to hire Chinese SOEs in order for Senegal to receive loans and
carryout infrastructure projects funded by China. Each SOE required a certain percentage
of their labor force to be imported from China. Dittgen argues that as the number of
Chinese SOEs in Senegal rose in the 1980s so did the number of Chinese laborers, and
that many Chinese SOEs and workers never left Senegal after their contracts expired. The
rise in the number of Chinese firms and thus Chinese migrants entering the market
dislodged thousands of Senegalese low-skill laborers.8 While Dittgen argues that the
Chinese SOE laborers were the first to enter Dakar’s informal market, I will demonstrate
in Chapter 7 that this is not in fact the case.
But as Politzer (2008) suggests, the most consequential category of Chinese
migrants in Senegal is that of the growing small-time entrepreneurs that have recently
infiltrated the Senegalese informal market. This inflow of Chinese people has stimulated
the creation of what contemporary literature deems “Chinatown”, a community of 3,000
Chinese entrepreneurs along the Boulevard du General de Gaulle in downtown Dakar.
Although immigrant numbers remain small relative to Dakar’s three-million-person
8

Hazard, Eric, et al. "The Developmental Impact of the Asian Drivers on Senegal." The World Economy
(2009): 1563-83. Print.
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population, Mohan and Tan-Mullins (2009) explain “…the generally small size of local
economies means that relatively few new entrants into the market can have
disproportionate effects.”9
Politzer argues that initially, SOE workers in Dakar noticed Senegalese vendors
selling goods that were made in China. The Chinese capitalized on the opportunity to
produce the same goods at lower production costs in China, exploiting their comparative
advantage available because of their common heritage with the Chinese manufacturers,
and direct ties to the country that removed middleman fees. This enabled the goods to be
sold for prices cheaper than Senegalese traders could charge, while still covering
production costs. As Chinese supplier surplus increased, so too did their profits. Through
well-developed networks, and encouraged by high profit margins and economic
incentives, the flow of low-income rural Chinese laborers disassociated with Chinese
government intensified. Consequentially, the number of Chinese commercial
establishments in Dakar multiplied sevenfold between 2002 and 2005 impacting
Senegalese retailers and consumers alike.10
Stanton (2011) breaks down the distinct advantages and disadvantages of each
affected group. While the Chinese stores increase their profit margins by underselling
their Senegalese counterparts, crowding the Senegalese retailers unable to compete out of
business, these same Chinese stores enable unemployed Senegalese entrepreneurs with
limited capital to buy large quantities of affordable goods used to open their own shops.
And while Chinese low-priced goods democratize consumption by increasing the

9

Mohan, Giles, and May Tan-Mullins. "Chinese Migrants in Africa as New Agents of Development? An
Analytical Framework." European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 589. Print.
10
Stanton, Peter. "Parallels in Chinese and French Interaction with a West African Nation." Senegalese
Analogies April.29 (2011). Print.
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purchasing power of low-income Senegalese families, the low quality of the cheaper
goods carry severe health risks, containing lead and plastic choking hazards. The
Senegalese government has done little to address the presence of illegal Chinese traders
who evade taxes, disrupt the local economy, and bribe customs officials to allow the
entrance of illegal Chinese goods into Dakar. This is partly due to Senegal’s increasing
dependence on Chinese development assistance as it seeks the transition to a mature
economy, and also because the Senegalese government cannot provide an alternative
source of employment or cheap products to a majority unemployed population.
In understanding the implications of the Chinese on Dakar’s informal economy, it
is vital to unravel the dominance of the Senegalese informal sector of the economy
relative to the formal market within the larger Senegalese context. As Granström (2009)
communicates, the informal sector is defined as the portion of the economy that is not
subject to taxes, government oversight or inclusion in the gross national product (GNP),
and is characterized by “low productivity due to low levels of skills, irregular earnings
and lack of access to financial assets, information, markets and technology.”11 This sector
is also known as the “black market,” in which traders resell cheap commodities originally
purchased within the formal market.
Senegal’s informal sector has provided an inlet into the local economy for the
unemployed looking to turn a profit. It protects thousands of Senegalese from the
absolute lowest levels of poverty by granting opportunities to women and economically
marginalized members of society. Additionally, the unemployment rate in Senegal hovers
around fifty percent, exacerbated by formal regulations and high capital costs that create
11

Granström, Sigrid Colnerud. "The Informal Sector and Formal Competitiveness in Senegal."
Nationalekonomiska Institutionen Vid Lunds Universitet 194.8 (2009): 10. Print.
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barriers to entry into the formal market. This has led to Senegal’s informal economy
growing at rates faster than its formal economy. The informal sector manifests itself in
downtown Dakar’s largest Senegalese market, Sandaga Market, where retailers sell a
wide range of commodities made locally and in China, from textiles, to electronics and
fresh food.12
These five themes encapsulated within these scholarly articles are widespread,
and divergent conclusions are not broadly available. Each positive effect on retailers and
consumers has a negative effect to counterbalance it. My firsthand research in January
provided a contrasting perspective and analysis of the implications of an expanding
Chinese presence within Dakar’s informal sector, and examined whether Senegalese
consumers benefited and traders gained or lost with the arrival of local Chinese.
The academic literature and critics conclude that, while there are costs and
benefits for both Senegalese retailers and consumers, Senegalese retailers within the
informal economy are disadvantaged by the presence of Chinese retailers, while
Senegalese consumers benefit from higher affordability of basic goods. The Chinese
traders’ base prices undercut those Senegalese traders are able to offer, given lower
production and transportation costs. This diminishes the Senegalese merchants’ ability to
compete, pushing some out of the market. These same cheap goods, on the other hand,
permit a larger portion of low-income Senegalese consumers to purchase a wider variety
of essential needs, such as clothing and glassware.
Field research analyzing consumer preferences confirms the advantages of
consumption democratization. Yet Senegalese personal and anecdotal experiences and
12

Granström, Sigrid Colnerud. "The Informal Sector and Formal Competitiveness in Senegal."
Nationalekonomiska Institutionen Vid Lunds Universitet 194.8 (2009): 10. Print.
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empirical observations made within Sandaga Market and the Centenaire region of Dakar
prove this hypothesis regarding Senegalese retailers incorrect. The biggest flaw in
contemporary literature is the erroneous characterization of all Chinese merchants as
retailers, rather than distinguishing between retail and wholesale. On the contrary, the
ambition of the Chinese in Dakar is strictly wholesale. Chinese wholesalers help expand
the informal market, providing more employment opportunities for undereducated
Senegalese entrepreneurs while also democratizing consumption for low-income
shoppers.
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3. Methodology
After four months of extensive research through Internet- and literature-based
sources, I traveled to Senegal for the month of January to expand upon and explore the
factual and experiential basis behind the above literature. The majority of my field
research was conducted in downtown Dakar, where both Chinese and Senegalese markets
are located.
To understand the context in which my research lies, I first observed the markets.
I compared the goods sold in Chinese-owned boutiques in the Centenaire to those sold in
the Senegalese Sandaga Market, noting which goods are sold in both locations, the
similarities and differences in targeted client markets, and how similar goods compare in
quality. I looked for markings of the country of production, such as Made in China. I also
surveyed who works in the shops as vendors (age, gender, nationality, language spoken).
These basic observations contributed to determining the level of competition between
Chinese and Senegalese traders within the same informal market selling similar goods,
and helped indicate employment and business practices within both cultures.
Price differentials are somewhat subjective, as prices of goods are not set by the
market, but rather through bargaining. I observed prices for similar goods found in both
Chinese and Senegalese markets first by asking a starting price, and secondly by seeing
how low I could haggle the price. I made general observations on the willingness of
vendors to bargain, as well as their assertiveness in attracting which types of customers. I
did take into consideration the fact that I was viewed as a white American female tourist
so my price offerings were inflated. To combat this, I had a Senegalese friend accompany
me, and negotiate half of the transactions. Through discussions with consumers, I gained
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insight into the average price they expect to pay for each good, why they are buying the
good, and why they chose this market. The consumers were strictly Senegalese as no
Chinese customers were observed walking around. (See Appendix D for sample
interview questions.)
The Centenaire is made up of around two hundred Chinese-owned storefronts so I
did not interview every storeowner. I walked up and down the Boulevard du General de
Gaulle and interviewed those shopping and selling goods along the way that were willing
to participate and spoke French, Wolof or English. There is the question of the legitimacy
of the sample that volunteers to participate. The plethora of storefronts to choose from
guarantees an appropriate diverse sampling of Chinese entrepreneurs as they come from
different Chinese provinces. This was confirmed in interviews conducted with
international scholars who conducted similar research in Dakar. I did the same at Sandaga
Market. The point is to get local impressions, and understand buyer and seller preferences
that complement my statistical and library research completed before arrival in Dakar.
With every visit to Sandaga Market and the Centenaire, I brought a Senegalese
escort. This enabled me to acquire the perspective and biases of local Senegalese
consumers, as well as take advantage of their fluency in the local languages spoken. As
mentioned, this also helped dissipate discrimination against being a white American
female.
I contacted various authors of the scholarly journals I based my literature research
on for insight into their research methods, Dakar contacts, and further findings. One
author in particular, Romain Dittgen, was in Dakar for a five-day conference in January
while I was doing field research, and generously spent time guiding me with my
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fieldwork and noting differences within the Chinese marketplace between 2009 when he
first conducted research and January 2013. The conference itself, entitled Interactions
Sud-Sud et Globalisation - Migrants Chinois en Afrique, Migrants Africains en Chine,
regards Chinese migration to Africa, and reciprocal African migration to China. After a
four-hour discussion with the organizer of the conference, Dr. Karsten Giese, I was
granted admission to attend this symposium from January 20 to January 24. Here, thirty
speakers originating from over ten different countries (including China and Senegal) shed
light on the Chinese experience in Africa, which was difficult to gain in my literature
research. Among others, topics ranged from the diversity of the Chinese population in
Africa, to motivations behind the Chinese entrepreneurial presence in Africa, and family
life abroad. Speakers also noted African benefits and responses to the Chinese, from the
transfer of technology and skill, to consumer demands, and employment. I received the
contacts and research papers of all participants. This conference removed the negativity I
had associated with the Chinese entrepreneurial presence in Senegal and, in seeing
similar phenomena happening in the rest of the continent as well as in China, helped me
recognize this as a new trend of capitalism and globalization not exclusive to Senegal.
I also attended a one-day symposium at the RAW Material Company entitled
Boulevard du Centenaire Made in China. This complemented a photography exhibit
showcasing the images Senegalese photographer Kan Si took of Chinese merchants and
boutiques in the Centenaire region. It was revealing of the way certain Senegalese
scholars portray the Chinese entrepreneurs, and what aspects of the Chinese presence in
Dakar were most important to capture. The symposium also involved a series of lectures
by local artists, journalists and academics, discussing the history and interactions of
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Chinese and Lebanese entrepreneurs in Dakar. There were certain shortcomings, such as
the lack of a Chinese or Lebanese representative, and much of the information provided
among the speakers was redundant. The symposium ended with a thirty minute showing
of the documentary “The Colony” produced by American documentarian Brent Huffman
and sponsored by Al Jazeera. Mr. Huffman was available for questions and conversation
afterwards. This symposium uncovered many generic local understandings of the Chinese
merchants in the Centenaire and was an important means of attaining the local academic
perspective on the Chinese, which mirrored Western contemporary literature.
Lastly, US Ambassador to Senegal Lewis Lukens agreed to let me interview him
about the Senegalese government’s approach to formalizing the informal market, and in
addressing issues of unemployment. He spoke generally of Senegalese perceptions of
Chinese merchants, and shed light on how visas in Senegal work. Lastly, he shared
insight regarding how embassies operate abroad in general, and in response to threats
towards individuals of the countries they represent.
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4. China in Africa
This chapter seeks to summarize the broader trends of China’s role and economic
interests in the African continent. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate why Senegal
does not fit this pattern.
Why is China Interested in Africa?
China’s power on the global stage grows in conjunction with its mounting
economic prowess. The nation serves an important role in leading South-South relations
between developing countries of similar histories and with comparable development
trajectories to combat the dominance of industrialized economies on the global economic
stage.13 China is primarily interested in Africa for the continent’s service as a generator
for China’s own internal economic development, via diplomatic relations, trade, and aid
between the two powers.
Natural Resource Provider While Africa remains the poorest and most
underdeveloped continent in the world, it has been endowed with a rich natural resource
base consisting of an enormous concentration of strategic minerals, such as gold, iron and
copper, and deposits of fuels like petroleum and oil. This has attracted extensive
investment and extraction by global economic powerhouses, such as Europe and China.
China’s economic growth is largely resource-intensive, magnified by its specialization in
resource-intensive commodities.14 China has exceeded its domestic resource capacity,
forcing its dependence on the importation of materials from Africa.15 Thus, China’s
export-oriented economy is complemented and supported by the importation of these
13
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intermediate goods, which in turn supports China’s manufacturing sector and broader
economic development. As a result, African mineral-rich countries have experienced a
significant increase in the extraction of resources by Chinese SOEs. The African
continent’s exports of raw materials to China increased eleven-fold between 2000 and
2012. And, once entirely self-sufficient in oil supplies, China now imports one third of all
its oil from the African continent.16 China’s motives extend beyond economic, however.
With an average 8% annual economic growth rate since the start of the millennium,
China’s ruling Chinese Community Party (CCP) has secured legitimacy amongst
domestic and global audiences. Therefore, to feed its exceptional growth rate, China must
grab hold of resources necessary to preserve its grasp on power.
Additionally, aside from imports from the African continent, China advances its
export-oriented economy via access to new markets by engaging in diplomatic and
commercial relations with the African continent. Since 2000, Chinese exports of
manufactured commodities, such as textiles and machinery, to Africa have increased nine
times and account for 4% of global trade.17
Industrial Base for Chinese Firms Africa is also growing as an industrial base for
Chinese companies. While mining has dominated the share of China’s total investment in
the African continent at around 29%, manufacturing is rapidly increasing its share,
currently held at 22%.18
Aside from national gains, Africa provides economic benefits for Chinese
individuals as well. China’s GDP was $12.38 trillion in 2012, but its GDP per capita was
16

Shinn, David, Ambassador, and Kerry Brown, Dr. "China and Africa: A Century of Engagement."
Chatham House June.29 (2012): 1-10. Print.
17
Ibid.
18
August, Oliver. "The Chinese in Africa: Trying to Pull Together." The Economist 20 Apr. 2011: 1-5. The
Economist. Web. 14 Oct. 2012. <http://www.economist.com/node/18586448>.

Hurst

18

low at $9,100, ranking it 118 of 228 countries. Accordingly, 13.4% of the population
lives below the poverty threshold.19 Many people choose to migrate to Africa to find jobs
and make money in economies much more open to innovation and free enterprise.
Chinese entrepreneurs and laborers have access to a multiplicity of job opportunities in
non-competitive African markets, and can practice greater freedoms in business
management in a less regulated arena. Chinese entrepreneurs can be their own bosses,
speak their minds without fear of government repression, and have fewer production
restrictions than in China.20 China is a hybrid economy combining aspects of socialism
and capitalism that ultimately stunt entrepreneurship and curb incentives to innovate.
African nations, alternatively, provide opportunities for all Chinese citizens of an
overcrowded state to flourish individually.21
Many Chinese have also discovered Africa as a legal escape from China’s One
Child Policy, a strategic national policy created in 1979 aimed at addressing excessive
population growth by forcibly limiting the number of children per family in China to
one.22 Coupled with new job opportunities, Chinese families are able to make money in
Africa, have multiple children, and with capital accumulated from African jobs, can
afford to send the children to higher education schools and universities in Europe.23
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Political Influence in Region China is a big player in many multilateral
organizations, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the United
National Human Rights Council (UNHRC). While wielding tremendous power in serving
as one of the Permanent Five in the UNSC, China has few powerful political allies, and
thus still battles to represent views opposing those of the largely Western-dominated
organization. By investing in Africa, China is able to gain not only economic, but also
political allies within the global arena. With an aggregate population of one billion, the
fifty-four nations on the African continent possess extreme potential as political agents,
and it is in China’s best interest to align politically and economically with as many
nations as possible. In exchange for support in the UNSC, China offers support for
developing African economies in the World Trade Organization (WTO).24 Western
countries often resent Chinese diplomatic ties with some African states, as alliances
disregard misconduct and focus solely on domestic gain.25
African countries permit China to enter and exploit their resources because the
deals are made between African and Chinese elites, who receive large economic benefits
from these exchanges at the expense of the masses. Relations with China allow African
nations to diversify their investment sources. Elites are willing to accept symbolic
projects as part of investment and aid packages, and they are indifferent to societal and
environmental consequences that affect locals.26 The Chinese government in Senegal, for
instance, fully funded the Grand National Theater and Black Civilization Museum in
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Dakar, as well as eleven football stadiums throughout the country that do not aid
development but rather serve to benefit Senegalese elites and China’s reputation.27
China’s demand for Africa’s resources, such as oil and animal feed, raises prices of these
goods in global markets. This is particularly damaging to African farmers that
consequentially face higher costs of living, but African elites see additional exports as
boosting GDP.28 Thus, Chinese investments are tightly tied to African elite interests that
often undermine those of the masses. Yet some African nations have shown resistance to
Chinese dominance in their local economies. Angola, for instance, banished a Chinese
state-owned oil company after a disagreement. The company ultimately came crawling
back offering more money.29 African nations resist absolute control by China and force
respectful cooperation. This aids in defeating notions of Chinese neocolonialism and
Africa as an amalgamation of developing economies vulnerable to exploitation.
Why It Matters As of 2012, China’s population accounted for nearly 20% of the
global total at 1.35 billion inhabitants. The entire continent of Africa, according to the
same source, is home to 1.1 billion inhabitants, 250 million fewer than China.30 Why
does this matter? China’s rapid economic growth will fundamentally alter “the strategic
agenda in Africa;” the country is so large that any change in growth, whether positive or
negative, will be felt in all trade partners around the world.31
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Diplomatic Relations
Exploring Chinese economic and political endeavors in the African continent is
vital to understanding China’s motives in investing specifically in Senegal. As Gehrold
and Tietze (2011) articulate, China first established relations with six African nations
under Mao Zedong in the Asia-Africa Conference of 1955. This set the stage for Africaoriented Chinese diplomacy in which China became progressively more involved in the
politics of the continent. In the 1960s and 1970s, Mao sent hundreds of Chinese to Africa
to cement diplomatic relations, and establish footholds for technicians to begin economic
development projects. By the mid-1970s, the emergence of Chinese businesses became
more prominent throughout African countries, namely Namibia and South Africa where
small businesses and textile firms flourished.32
China has gradually accumulated additional diplomatic allies in Africa, from a
mere six in 1955 to forty-nine out of fifty-four in 2012. The first Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting in October 2000, served as a platform for dialogue
between Chinese and African political and business elites seeking to improve trade
relations and promote economic cooperation. It involved forty-four African nations. In
November 2009, China partook in the largest diplomatic forum in Chinese history—the
fourth FOCAC ministerial meeting with forty-nine African nations. Goals aimed to
enhance trade, development assistance, cultural exchanges, tourism, and high-level
dialogue between the states.33
In order to further diplomacy, China has highlighted Africa and China’s shared
history of oppression and exploitation by the West. It stresses principles of equality,
32
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mutual benefit, sovereignty, and non-interference, showcasing itself as a benevolent nonoppressive partner.34 China-Africa, essentially, is a win-win strategy. As a result, China
turns a blind eye to poor governance and political systems that execute genocide and
human rights violations in order to secure as many allies in the South as possible. China’s
relations with Sudan are perhaps its most controversial, continuing its diplomatic
engagement while becoming subject to the ongoing Darfur conflict, in which 400,000
Sudanese have been killed in widespread ethnic genocide. In October 2008, for example,
Sudanese militants held nine China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) oil workers
hostage, ultimately killing five. Yet CNPC continues to control 60-70% of Sudan’s total
oil production. Diplomatic relations between China and the African continent continue to
grow, and trade is multiplying as a result.35 This goes to suggest that China is in African
to stay, investing in long-term projects, and establishing strategic relations. But while
China remains a dominant and influential economic player in Africa, Africa’s influence
in China remains extremely limited.
It is clear that China is increasingly extending its reach throughout the continent.
As China’s presence continues to grow, its political involvement in Africa also increases.
Chinese diplomats are establishing strong ties and negotiating with African elites (rather
than the masses) and are able to play state, provincial, and private actor interests off of
one another to get the best deal.36 Nonintervention in politics facilitates greater
diplomatic transactions and strengthens ties in economics.
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Trade and Commercial Relations
Increased diplomatic ties have also led to enhanced economic presence.
Commercial relations between the two powers have deep roots in Mao Zedong’s
international policy of the 1960-70s, as previously mentioned above. Today, China serves
as Africa’s third largest trading partner, behind the United States and France, and its
leading trading partner for commodity-based economies.37 In 2007, total trade between
China and Africa reached $73 billion, and eight months later soared to $107 billion in
2008, attaining and exceeding the FOCAC 3 objective of US$100 billion before 2010 two
years early.38
Due to its strength in manufacturing, and its cheap production costs, China is able
to provide cheaper imports than other foreign traders, such as the European Union.
African nations therefore trade more heavily with China for manufactured commodities
where similar goods available in other markets are accessible at lower costs. However,
this has negative consequences for domestic import-competing industries, such as textile
and clothing manufacturers who shed thousands of employees annually to compete with
Chinese cheaper prices.39
Experts have noted China’s growing attention to commercial security issues.
China has set up naval vessels to line Africa’s eastern coast so as to secure exports of raw
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materials, and not be dependent on foreign security forces for protection. In a similar
effort, Chinese forces have initiated anti-piracy brigades in the same area.40
Aid, Investment & Infrastructure
As discussed, African nations provide not only resources that continue boosting
China’s economic wealth and power, but also hold significant future economic potential
for success. It is a largely untapped pool of wealth that China is slowly tapping into,
aided with monetary investments.41 Beyond trade, a large portion of Chinese existence in
Africa is spurred by investments in infrastructure and developmental projects, carried out
by Chinese state-owned enterprises such as China Henan (CHICO), ZTE and Huawei.42
China spends about US$50 billion a year, or around 75% of its private investment, in
construction abroad alone. These projects include dams, roads, bridges, railways, and
ports that aid the extraction of natural resources and goods from mines and local markets,
and the transport of such products to global markets. They also serve as entry points for
Chinese goods to access local markets. China has more recently also moved into
agriculture and farming investments to the fear of many rural African farmers whose
living is based on their local monopoly of this industry.43 The China-Africa Development
Fund (CAD Fund), China’s largest private equity fund focusing on African investments,
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has raised US$1 billion, primarily targeting agriculture, but also other sectors, such as
infrastructure, manufacturing, energy and mining.44
Trade and diplomacy is all about compromise and incentives. China discovered
that it must provide Africa with significant aid, purchase non-resource products, and
supply appropriate skills in specific sectors where there is capacity scarcity, in order to
receive access to Africa’s riches and resources.45 China issues package deals, offering
aid, security support, and extensive infrastructure investments in exchange for access to
natural resources and materials for manufacturing.46 China’s foreign direct investments
(FDIs) in Africa grew from 2.62% of China’s total FDI in 2003 to 9.82% in 2008. This
investment is almost exclusively in countries rich in natural resources.47 China has a
tendency to deal with individual countries rather than via the African Union (AU).
Practicing good governance is not a prerequisite for African nations in receiving
development aid.48
Implications & Perceptions
Kaplinsky argues that the potential outcomes of China’s deepening presence in
Africa largely depend on how key stakeholders react, and are not yet defined.
Yet many negative perceptions of the Chinese heavy involvement in the African
continent already exist. To begin, China’s extensive diplomatic relations with African
44
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countries are often judged by Western nations as China’s attempt to accumulate political
allies in powerful multilateral organizations to strengthen China’s negotiating power in a
Western-dominated forum, such as the UNSC and WTO.49
Others denounce the economic downfalls of China’s prominent involvement in
Africa, outlined in Oliver August’s Economist article and validated by Deborah
Brautigam. These include deficient corporate social responsibility, poor labor relations,
competition with import-substituting industries, and not enough hiring of local labor. The
building of African infrastructure is nearly always entrusted in foreign enterprises despite
the existence of domestic construction companies in African nations. Many African
employees in these enterprises claim similar competence in construction, and better
monitoring and maintenance of structures in the medium- and long-run. Additionally,
Chinese enterprises do not combat local unemployment as frequently as sources suggest
because they remain in Africa only for the duration of their contracts. Employment for
thousands of Africans by these SOEs lasts a matter of months or years, but after the
Chinese leave, the Africans sink back into unemployment. Chinese firms concentrate on
short-run gains when the African people need long-term security. The prevalence of
Chinese construction firms in Africa undermines local business development and
competency, and focuses on the short-run.50 Despite immediate results, this has future
implications that could harm economic development rather than further it.
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Statistics Exaggerated, Contradictory & Nonexistent
Western media generally portrays China’s presence in the African continent as
heavily demonizing. In fact, few decisive figures are actually known to the Western
world regarding Chinese investments abroad, whether in Africa or elsewhere. To begin,
China is not a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)51, like the US and many European countries, so it is not required to publish its
development aid budget. According the Gehrold and Tietze, the definition of
development aid in China differs from that of the OECD.52 Therefore, it is extremely
difficult for non-Chinese economic analysts to substantiate exact data regarding flows of
Chinese investment and development assistant abroad.
Deborah Brautigam, author of the Dragon’s Gift, confirms through data certain
negative aspects of the China-Africa relationship. But she asserts that media sources
hyperbolize facts and make erroneous claims that Brautigam contends leads to a
misrepresentation of their relationship (examples from “China in Africa: The Real Story”
if necessary). Raphael Kaplinsky continues this argument, stating, “We know almost
nothing of these magnitudes [of the data regarding aid, investment and migration
numbers].” Some reporters seek to obscure reality, he continues, other times data changes
so rapidly it become outdated before publication.
Still others maintain that Western reports are too simplified and exacerbate
prejudicial imagery. In failing to distinguish between differentiated migrant communities,
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the Chinese are often misrepresented in the singular, implying unity and homogeneity
where that is rarely the case. The media also exaggerate state-driven decision-making.
Chinese migrants in Africa largely work and travel unassisted by the Chinese
government, so this falsity compounds distortions. Lastly, reports commonly characterize
the African people as children without agency. They are powerless victims to China’s
selfish neocolonial pursuits.53
Who disseminates this information?
Critics are largely Western media sources with inherent biases against Chinese
penetration of developing economies and governmental systems. But it is not exclusive to
the West. Many African sources are also condemnatory of the Chinese presence.
Surprisingly, these sources tend to be those individuals that are least affected by the
Chinese presence. In the case of Dakar, Senegal and the ubiquity of Chinese merchants in
the market, Senegalese critics tend to be academics and policymakers rather than the lowincome consumers that shop primarily Chinese-made goods.
Why It Matters
Public opinion is vital in legitimizing policy debates and political choices.
Simplistic views of misunderstood communities limit critical understandings of the
varying national and international interests of states around the world. As will be
addressed in Chapter 8, proper understanding of the Chinese in Dakar, Senegal helps
mediate tensions between local retailer and consumer unions that seek to expel and
protect Chinese traders, respectively.
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5. Who is Senegal?
Historical Development of Senegal
Senegal has a long history of foreign influence largely owing to its function as a
regional and international commercial hub and gateway into West Africa. Since the
fourteenth century, what is Senegal today has been passed between Portuguese, Dutch,
British and most importantly French political control, with significant implications in
forging new societal and governance structures. Senegal was a French colony from the
mid-nineteenth century through 1960, and was home to French West Africa’s colonial
capital, St. Louis (later moved to Dakar in 1902). Today, Senegal is a stable Westwardpointing democracy, with major trading partners including the United States and former
colonizer France. Geographically, Senegal is the furthest west tip of Africa, and remains
the only African nation to never have experienced a coup d’état. Despite numerous
distinct tribal ethnicities, 94% of the population is Muslim.
Due to its strategic geographic location, Senegal has traditionally served as an
international commercial hub, most significantly functioning as the last stopping point in
Africa before heading to the Americas in the Atlantic Slave Trade of the 1600-1700s.
Senegal is both an exit from and a point of entry into West Africa. Today, with an
international airport and major shipping port, Dakar provides vital access to inner West
Africa where infrastructure is less developed. This has aided the economic development
of West African nations, and also led to migration to Dakar for economic purposes.
Poverty has plagued the Senegalese population for centuries. Today, over half of
Dakar’s population of 2.5 million people is less than twenty years old, with forty-three
percent of the population of working age (20-59 years). Yet only 61% of school age
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children attend school and unemployment soars at 48%. Much to do with this is poor
access to education, with 43.4% of Dakar illiterate, concentrated mainly amongst women
and adults. Similar poor access to healthcare leads to malnutrition and chronic illness that
prevent children and adults from entering the formal economy. Poverty resulting from
poor education and healthcare forces many Senegalese to enter the informal market,
where the majority of revenue amongst poor households in Dakar originates, 27%.54
The Informal Sector
There are many factors causing poverty in Senegal, namely Dakar’s
overpopulation, endemic unemployment, difficult access to credit, high costs of living,
and natural disasters, such as droughts and floods leading to rural exodus. The
government fail to provide an open environment for entrepreneurs to innovate and for
workers to enter the formal economy. High taxes and bureaucratic red tape often push
entrepreneurs to participate in illicit behavior, such as bribing government officials to
bypass certain restrictive regulations. There are many other barriers to enter the formal
economy, including limited access to a quality education, to healthcare services and to
public goods. Consequentially, the Senegalese are unable to fill their full potential
without the necessary human, physical and financial capital attained through schooling
and basic employment.55 As a result, about 61% of the urban labor force is employed by
Senegal’s informal economy.56

54

"République du Sénégal: Région de Dakar." Cellule de Suivi du Programme de Lutte contre la Pauvreté
(CSPLP). Dakar: Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, 2007. 1-14. Print.
55
Human capital is a measure of the economic value of an employee’s skill set (investopedia.com).
Financial capital is money used to purchase necessary means of production and assets to start a business.
56
"République du Sénégal: Région de Dakar." Cellule de Suivi du Programme de Lutte contre la Pauvreté
(CSPLP). Dakar: Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, 2007. 1-14. Print.

Hurst

32

What is an Informal Economy?
Informal economy refers to commercial activities that transpire outside the
official bounds of government regulations and taxation. It is characterized by low
productivity and skill levels, poor and irregular earnings, long work hours, and a lack of
access to information, markets, financial assets, training and technology.57 Entry into the
informal market is rarely voluntary, but rather a necessity for the desperately
impoverished. As in the case of Senegal, complex government regulations, high taxation,
lack of finance, and poor access to capital create barriers to entry into formal markets,
and force individuals to pursue informal activity.58 With no guarantee that a firm will
become or remain profitable once it enters the formal market, the cost of formalizing is
too high and incentives are too low.59 The informal economy, on the other hand, has low
barriers to entry, requires low levels of education and skills, and is labor-intensive rather
than capital intensive, so limited capital is required to enter.60
Workers often “operate in the hidden,” meaning there are no contracts for
employees, and firms and output are not registered with the local government so they are
not taxed. Thus informality is often associated with illegality, stealing market shares from
formal firms, escaping taxation and keeping firms small to avoid government detection.61
There are some downfalls to the informal economy. To begin, it deprives the
government of tax revenue that could be reinvested in infrastructure and development
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projects. National economic development is therefore curbed, which curtails formal
employment opportunities. Employees are also hurt by poor remuneration, job insecurity
and scarce social protection.62 But if the government is unwilling to reform and simplify
regulations, taxation and bankruptcy laws, or improve services and access to credit, then
the reality of the informal sector will continue to strengthen and grow.63
So, while the informal sector may curb overall national growth, it is a second best
option in providing work and an available source of income for poorly educated
individuals wishing to enter the market. Women in particular benefit in the informal
economy from increased bargaining power through the acquisition of a paid job,
improving their social and economic standing. The presence of an informal economy also
serves as a buffer in times of economic instability as it is comparatively unaffected by
exogenous shocks, like financial crises. Lastly, it provides intermediary goods to the
formal sector. The informal economy serves to benefit individuals, the formal economy
and the national economy. It is protection against the absolute lowest level of poverty. It
is also a force of creative destruction, pushing inefficient, non-profitable producers out of
the market, and making room for creative and efficient production.64
History of Dakar’s Informal Economy
As previously mentioned, foreign minorities have a historical role in significantly
influencing Dakar’s economic and political spheres. French colonials and Lebanese
immigrants, Lebanon being another important French colony at the time, monopolized
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Dakar shopkeeping in the early to mid-1900s. This curbed the maturation of a Senegalese
capitalist class, and instead pressured urban Senegalese to survive off petty trade.
Working class French and Lebanese entrepreneurs became business managers despite
inadequate qualifications as their education and business skills were better developed
relative to local levels.65
The bulk of French colonials flocked back to France in the 1960s after Senegal’s
independence and as they retired. By the 1970s, the French colonial ambiance was nearly
entirely removed. But the Lebanese retained their economic sway. As a result,
immigration was officially restricted in 1964, despite already being in decline since the
government’s take over of the peanut industry, which the Lebanese controlled for a time.
The Lebanese that remained in Senegal were fairly prosperous but contributed negligibly
to Senegal’s economic development. They sent most of their profits home to Lebanon
and relied on family and community networks for employment rather than the local labor
force. They learned French, Arabic and Wolof but preserved their distinct identity.66
Dakar’s informal economy has always existed, but it mushroomed in the past half
century. The 1970s and 80s proved critical years. Senegal experienced a series of
unfortunate natural and economic events forcing unemployment and overall economic
instability.67 It began in the seventies when reduced agricultural returns and thus reduced
profitability of the sector, coupled with inflation led to a recession. This intensified with
the 1974 oil shock, spurring a massive displacement of people from the interior of the
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country. The usual seasonal exodus to Dakar became permanent.68 Due to a lack of
schooling, funding, and capital, and with few technical skills, these former agricultural
workers were unable to enter the formal urban labor force. Instead, they sought informal
employment in Dakar. The informal economy quickly developed as the primary provider
of work for the Senegalese population as a whole.69
In the eighties, the situation worsened with a series of droughts that furthered the
decline of the agricultural sector. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund
introduced structural adjustments, forcing Senegal to liberalize trade, privatize business
and decentralize the financial system. This caused further factory closures and job loss.70
Slums and homelessness came to dominate Dakar’s city center and the informal economy
grew to conquer the trade sector.
Senegal devalued its franc CFA on January 13, 1994 in an effort to boost exports
and stabilize the economy. Terms of trade grew while poverty appeared to fall. But the
poverty reduction was not evenly distributed, and official real wages decreased
nationally. There was a rise in private investments that concentrated on the urban trading
sector, leading to urbanization, which contributed to the growing informal sector.71 In
2000, the informal market accounted for 43% of Senegal’s GDP. Between 1995 and
2004, 97% of new jobs came from the informal sector. Within that same decade, there
was a three percent increase in informal employment compared to a one percent increase
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in formal employment.72
Thus, throughout history, Senegal’s informal sector grew faster than its formal
sector, and quickly became the primary employer particularly of entrepreneurs. Of the
firms operating in today’s informal market, 25% were created since 1999 compared with
just 5% since 1980. So businesses are new and quickly developing. 61% of Senegal’s
urban labor force is concentrated in Dakar’s informal sector, and accounts for 30% of
Dakar’s total economic output. Informal economies are labor-intensive by nature.
Senegal nationally has a low capital-to-labor ratio thus making it more profitable to
pursue informal economic activities. The sector has three subdivisions: industry,
commerce and services, with commerce accounting for 68.9%.73
A small workforce, long hours and business mobility characterize Dakar’s
informal sector. 74% of informal businesses are self-employed, with only 7% having
more than three employees. The average workweek requires 54 hours of labor, with up to
32.1% of employees working more than 60 hours a week. Despite opportunity costs, such
as leisure time, long workweeks satisfy customer demand, increasing firm income.
Lastly, 75% of informal businesses have no fixed location, largely due to short business
life averaging 9.4 years, and high costs of rent.74
Compared to other African countries, Senegal’s economy is highly productive.
However, this statistic conceals certain discrepancies. The formal sector is six times more
productive than the informal sector, largely due to broader matters, such as access to
schooling. 53% of informal employees do not have schooling compared to just 10% of
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formal workers. Overall, wages are 2.7 times larger and schooling is 3.3 times more
frequent in formal employment.75 Human capital developed through education correlates
with competitiveness, economic development and productivity, hence why the formal
economy is more advanced in all three of these sectors.76
Today, Senegal’s informal economy is a thriving source of employment for
undereducated entrepreneurs. The structural adjustments from the eighties helped
stabilize the economy, but hindered the development of a modern industrial and business
sector in Senegal. Thus the economic crisis proves the importance of the informal sector
in neutralizing the negative effects on output and employment.77
Major markets and goods produced
“All of Dakar is a marketplace,” as Angela Dodson of the New York Times
accurately states.78 Dakar is scattered with a variety markets, from Soumbedioune Village
Artisanal, to Colobane, Kermel and HLM 5. The largest market in Dakar is Sandaga
Market, selling everything from a customer’s next meal to low-end toys, jewelry,
clothing and furniture. It is the most central market in Dakar, located 200 meters from La
Place de l’Indépendance. Sandaga attracts locals, but vendors make the most profit off of
unknowing tourists who do not know local prices. Vendors in Sandaga tend to be
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Senegalese males that target low-income Senegalese customers and toubabs, a nonderogatory term used to describe foreigners, typically of European descent.79
The market itself is located inside a dilapidated three-storey building, and is
surrounded by hundreds of tightly compacted tables and stalls. It is a literal maze trying
to navigate the narrow walkways, with a fast-paced flow of customers, and aggressive
vendors shouting daily deals and following potential clients. A majority of the goods sold
in Sandaga market are counterfeits, bought either directly from China or the halfway
point of Dubai, or from the Chinese wholesalers in Dakar’s Centenaire.80

Figure 1. Sandaga Market Place in Dakar, by Rindra Ramasomanana

79

"Marchés de Dakar." Sénégalaisement. Web. 6 Feb. 2013.
<http://www.senegalaisement.com/senegal/dakar_marches.php>.
80
Georgina Hurst. Sandaga Market, Dakar, Senegal. January 9-28, 2013.

Hurst

39

Hurst

40

6. China-Senegal Relations
Chinese traders in Dakar have significantly affected business activities and
practices within Dakar’s informal market. Therefore, it is informative to recognize
Chinese-Senegalese interactions on various scales to situate the Chinese traders within
this broader context.
When it comes to Sino-African relations, Senegal is a peculiar fit in the puzzle.
As we have seen, China historically invests in oil-rich African nations, such as Angola,
Namibia and Sudan, to meet the demands of China’s expanding consumer base.
Furthermore, since the 1950s when the African continent served as an ideological
battleground between communism and capitalism, China has actively sought political
allies against Western capitalist forces. Yet since independence in 1960, Senegal has been
a stable democratic, capitalist state with a limited resource endowment. This is the first
indicator that China’s major influence on Senegal lies outside of Chinese government
activities and more within informal networks.
Senegal’s relationship with China is dynamic and ever changing.81 As discussed,
Senegal has shifted between recognizing the PRC and Taiwan since the 1960s. Most
recently in 2005, Senegal transferred diplomatic endorsement to the PRC, anticipating
sustainable development benefits and rise in foreign trade, but economic relations remain
unbalanced.82
Brief Summary of Trade & Investment
Senegal and China engage in formal commercial activities, government to
government. Until 2003, tea was Senegal’s main import from China at 17% of total
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imports. 2004 textiles overtook tea, and 2005 construction materials dominated. Trade,
therefore, has diversified and grown between the two economic powers. Senegalese
exports to China tripled from 2000 to 2005, but remain minimal at only 0.5% the total
value of Senegal’s global exports.83 Many critics, such as Sijh Diagne, claim the Chinese
presence in Senegal threatens local producers’ ability to compete legally in domestic and
international markets. Thus, Senegalese actors are increasingly dependent on Chinese
imports for consumption.84
As a result of diversified relations, China has invested heavily in culture, sports,
education, agriculture and energy rather than just infrastructure and development in
Senegal. With the creation of a national theater and eleven soccer stadiums, motives
behind such investments are curious and deemed prestige projects, showing off Chinese
wealth and power with the intention of gaining esteem and political allies.85 Investment in
Senegal suggests potential as a source of untapped capital and economic growth.86
Main Chinese economic actors in Senegal
China’s manufacturing superiority empowers the Chinese to infiltrate various
sectors of Senegal’s economy, most notably textiles. The Chinese comparative advantage
in producing affordable clothing makes it cheaper for emerging economies such as
Senegal to import Chinese manufactured goods rather than produce them domestically.
Furthermore, electricity is an expensive input, and constant electricity cuts in Dakar
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increase utility prices. Chinese mitigate these expenses through government subsidies or
domestic manufacture. This undercuts Senegalese import-competing firm profits, forcing
many to shed thousands of textile employees to cover costs.87 In the informal market, this
has a more positive implication, as discussed in Chapter 7.
In terms of development, the Chinese state-owned enterprise China Henan
International Cooperation Group (CHICO) is a principal actor. CHICO helped
significantly in Dakar’s expansion and modernization in developing road, canal and water
supply systems.88 The SOE never left Senegal after being hired by the Senegalese
government in the 1980s, despite a break in diplomatic relations in the 1990s, and today
is among the most competitive public works companies in Senegal.89 Huawei and ZTE
have a smaller impact on the Senegalese economy, working specifically in
telecommunications and information technology.90 Specifically, Huawei supplied a
modern technology network to the Senegalese national government.91
There is also a varied list of influential Chinese economic actors that act
independently of Chinese federal agendas and big Chinese actors. These include
businessmen in trade, services, light manufacturing and construction.92 Perhaps the most
important subset of economic actors within this category is that of Chinese entrepreneurs
permeating the commercial sector of the informal economy where barriers to entry are

87

Alden, Chris. “Chin in Africa,” Zed Books; London/NY; International African Institute, Royal African
Society, Social Science Research Council, 2007.
88
Gehrold, Stefan, and Lena Tietze. Far From Altruistic: China's Presence in Senegal. KAS, 2011. Print.
89
Hazard, Eric, et al. "The Developmental Impact of the Asian Drivers on Senegal." The World Economy
(2009): 1563-83. Print.
90
Dittgen, Romain. "From Isolation to Integration? A Study of Chinese Retailers in Dakar." South African
Institute of International Affairs: China in Africa Project Occasional Paper.57 (2010): 1-14. Print.
91
Gehrold, Stefan, and Lena Tietze. Far From Altruistic: China's Presence in Senegal. KAS, 2011. Print.
92
Mohan, Giles, and May Tan-Mullins. "Chinese Migrants in Africa as New Agents of Development? An
Analytical Framework." European Journal of Development Research 21.4 (2009): 588-605. Print.

Hurst

43

few. They engage in petty manufacturing and printing, and they own boutiques,
restaurants, and massage parlors.93
Chinese Migratory Trends
Migration is shaped by varying push and pull factors, but it is important to note
the capitalist world economy is a major influence in migration patterns today. There is a
modern ideology of development that attracts people from around the world to migrate to
countries where economic opportunities are greater than at home.94 Entrepreneurs and
firms seek to operate in less competitive markets with lower production costs to decrease
expenses and maximize profit. This often prompts relocation abroad.
Although today Chinese migration to Senegal is largely independent of state
influence, Chinese emigration policies of the past largely impacted the scale and type of
migration. Historically, Chinese migrants have lived in Africa since Dutch and British
colonizers imported small numbers of Chinese workers in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries to work in public infrastructure and agricultural projects.95 The Qing Dynasty of
China issued decrees in 1712 and 1724 that forbade emigration and overseas trade to
prevent Ming Dynasty supporters from establishing bases abroad. But, after the Opium
Wars in the 1840s and 1850s, in which China suffered a humiliating defeat, colonial
powers took over and forced China to allow emigration. This led to the creation of the
“coolie trade” in which Chinese manual laborers were shipped out to the Americas and
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African colonies under Western labor contracts, sometimes forcefully, and sent back after
the contracts expired.96
The politically fragmented Republic of China (ROC) was established in 1912, but
civil war with Mainland China developed shortly after. Ultimately, Mao Zedong’s
Communist Party won control of Mainland China, declaring it the People’s Republic of
China in 1949, and forced ROC members to flee offshore to Taiwan. This period was
vital to Chinese migration as 22 million people left the PRC to form the ROC. Today,
around the world, political tensions continue to exist in diasporic communities between
PRC and ROC citizens. As previously mentioned, the economically dominant PRC
provides favorable aid to African countries supporting the PRC over Taiwan under the
One-China Policy.97
China’s economic liberalization in the late 1970s after Mao’s death weakened the
state’s role in emigration. The state privatized Chinese SOEs, neutralized the national
emigration policy, deregulated labor recruitment, and increased private labor contracts.
This enabled individualized pursuit of economic success within China, and abroad. The
idea was to increase foreign investment abroad and also open the Chinese economy to
foreign investment to allow for development.98 Between the 1960s and 1980s, 150,000
Chinese technical assistants were dispatched to Africa. These were temporary
appointments, but many chose to stay in Africa to engage in commercial activities that
allowed for remittances.
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As aforementioned, recent FOCAC developments focus on increasing diplomatic,
economic, political and touristic ties between the continent and China. As a result,
Politzer estimates that over 234,000 Chinese people have traveled to African countries. It
is important to note that there are distinctions between the experiences of Chinese
migrants throughout the African countries to which they migrate. There is no unified
experience or diasporic identity.99
As China-Africa relations have picked up momentum, Chinese government
authorities have become more assertive in encouraging the Chinese population to migrate
to China. In 2007, for instance, Li Ruogu, the head of China’s Exim Bank, urged poor
farmers to move to Africa, promising to support their migration with employment in
investment projects, to provide project development, and to support the sale of
entrepreneurs’ products.100
Migration to Senegal is not always easy, especially for clandestine migrants.
Formal Chinese employees are often sent to China tied with a Chinese firm or recruiting
agency. They are guaranteed a job and receive working visas. Those Chinese laborers
that travel via informal social and familial networks often go undocumented, as visas are
prohibitively expensive and difficult to attain. Relatives and personal connections help
these Chinese entrepreneurs find jobs, but opportunities are often restricted to the
informal economy.101
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Given strong push and pull factors, Chinese natives are traveling the world today
in the capitalist pursuit of wealth in a globalized economy.
Why It Matters
Chinese in Senegal tend to be transitory migrants, meaning they engage in petty
trade in a noncompetitive environment in an effort to acquire enough capital to eventually
sustain business in Western Europe, where cost of living is elevated and profits are
higher. Also, Chinese employees at large companies tend to remain only for the duration
of the contract before returning home.102 The ambition of these immigrant communities
in Senegal is strictly short-term economic gain. Also, there is a strong disconnect
between China-Senegal relations on governmental level and unassociated Chinese
merchants at the informal level that act independently. Chinese migrants are not Chinese
government pawns; they act under their own will. This defeats claims of Chinese
neocolonialism often found in contemporary rhetoric.
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7. Chinese Presence in Centenaire Region of Dakar
History of Centenaire & Boulevard du General de Gaulle
The Centenaire region is located in downtown Dakar. Once a prestigious
residential area, the neighborhood transformed into what the local Senegalese call
“Chinatown” starting in the 1990s with a wave of Chinese immigrants searching for
economic opportunity. In the 1970s, President Leopold Senghor funded a housing
project, supplying affordable accommodations for Senegalese government employees and
civil servants, when previously adequate housing was unavailable. The area’s residents
granted the Centenaire a certain prestige and higher class than surrounding
neighborhoods.103
In the late 1980s and 1990s, aging occupants of the residential complex began
retiring and dying. This, coupled with the 1994 FCFA devaluation, significantly
exacerbated the financial situation of polygamist Senegalese families, in which generally
one family member earns income for multiple wives and umpteen children.
Subsequently, Centenaire property was sold.104
At this same time, Chinese SOEs began entering the Senegalese economic stage.
Upon participating in local Dakar markets, Chinese SOE employees recognized an
extraordinary economic opportunity for relatives back home. Senegalese hawkers and
vendors sold Chinese goods almost exclusively. SOE workers alerted entrepreneurial
relatives at home to the opportunity to capitalize on cheaper domestic production and
transportation costs of the same goods relative to Senegalese rates. This led to an influx
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of Chinese businessmen independent of the Chinese government to Dakar that adapted to
local market conditions quickly.
The entrepreneurial Chinese immediately engaged in commercial activities within
Dakar’s informal market, where capital requirements, fixed costs and barriers to entry
were low. They initially established boutiques along Petersen Avenue, where commercial
activity was directly linked to the ebb and flow of consumers via the Petersen bus station.
Over time, the Chinese extended along the Boulevard du General de Gaulle, initially as a
place of residence. The Boulevard gradually converted to a commercial area as Chinese
popularity rose among local consumers, and demand for boutiques grew with it. Chinese
merchants rented front yards from Senegalese residents in the Centenaire, built stalls, and
transformed garages to shops. Those migrants with longer-term goals, or who sought to
ultimately sell for profit bought property instead of renting. Today, most Chinese live in
the Gibraltar neighborhood behind the Boulevard, using their homes for storage.
Residents welcomed the Chinese, whom alleviated their financial stresses and allowed
many elderly to retire. With limited supply and high demand for homes among Chinese
migrants, the Senegalese could charge rates higher than to an exclusively Senegalese
market.105 Thus, the influx of Chinese caused a real estate boom in the Centenaire and
surrounding areas.106
Progressively, an informal market was established. Senegalese took advantage of
the Chinese presence in reinventing themselves and becoming self-employed. Former
local hawkers settled along Boulevard du General de Gaulle and became table retailers
(tabliers), buying their goods in bulk from Chinese boutiques. This increased efficiency
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in allocating resources quickly and at lower cost to consumers. Roads running
perpendicular to the main Boulevard enabled the steady expansion of the informal market
and job market in the area. Economies of scale attracted a huge consumer base
Most Senegalese in Dakar have rural origins, and thus lack the necessary
technical skills to enter the formal urban market with limited education and experience.
Without steady employment and thus no income, Senegalese entrepreneurs were unable
to afford trips to China to buy goods and enter even the informal market. With the
flooding of Chinese within the Centenaire, Chinese goods are affordably transported to
Senegal and purchased by locals for resale.107 The Chinese entrepreneurs, therefore, have
helped expand informal employment of Senegalese retailers by absorbing certain
expenses that Senegalese vendors no longer have to. Secondly, despite remaining
removed from the surrounding Senegalese society, the Chinese do hire two to three
Senegalese youth per shop, both male and female, to serve menial tasks essential to
business sustainability. The Senegalese mainly serve as security, or interpreters and
negotiators for Senegalese clients, as the Chinese do not know the local French and
Wolof languages.108 The Senegalese also know local prices and general consumer needs.
Employment of females is also relatively unique to the Chinese petty entrepreneurs, and
progressive in an otherwise conservative society.
Existing diasporic communities are essential in new migrant integration, and the
constant flux of migrants helps facilitate physical connections back to family and
producers on Mainland China. As a result, the Chinese remain relatively self-contained,
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maintaining their own languages and culture, while adapting those necessary to play their
relative advantages.109
The perpetuation of business is heavily reliant on information from a broad
network of kin that provides employment opportunities and aid with transportation. This
is best described by the Chinese term guanxi, “a close personal trust between
individuals,” or literally translated as relationships.110 Chinese business practice is based
on trust and cooperation, with kin engaging in regular voluntary favors. Business and
employment are also highly personalized and informal. There are no written contracts, set
wages or regulated credit relations. Confidence in both employer and employee is
essential in upholding wage and labor agreements, hence why family is primarily used.
Guanxi is imperative in understanding Chinese business in Dakar. First of all, the
boutiques are prone to business succession, and therefore Chinese merchants utilize
guanxi to import family labor. In particular, there is a very close relationship between
uncles and nephews in Chinese culture. An uncle buys a boutique in Dakar, and imports a
nephew as cheap labor. Jobs are low-skill, and on the low end of the wage scale, thus
allowing employment to be based off of relationships rather than skill or merit. The uncle
pays for airfare, residence, food and other means of survival while in Dakar while the
nephew works for “free” for a set number of years. After a set period of time, the nephew
receives a large lump sum of money, equivalent to hundreds of thousands of USD. Nearly
all Chinese are in the Centenaire through relatives. One man, for instance, may own three
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shops and import a different family member to work each shop, selling the same goods.
Sometimes boutique owners do not work at all, or conduct business from China.111
A strong network of trustworthy Chinese kin, and the constant movement of
Chinese migrants to and from China provide superior access to supplies and resources
from Mainland China for those in Dakar.112 Chinese men and women are in the
Centenaire, but rarely full families because wives of boutique owners are part of the
supply chain. They live in China, purchase goods from the Chinese manufacturer, and
ship them to Dakar. There the husband boutique owner sells the goods in the open
market.113 This gives Chinese traders an advantage over Senegalese traders that travel to
China to purchase the same commodities for retail, but also opens the door for many
Senegalese traders that instead purchase directly from the Chinese wholesalers in Dakar.
The Centenaire as an Informal Market
The Chinese market in the Centenaire is similar to Sandaga Market in terms of the
goods sold, but the layout and the way business is practiced differ greatly. To begin, the
Chinese boutiques are spread out between two wide streets and stretch two to three
blocks with no definitive end point. The Chinese merchants are passive and contained,
conducting all business over the counter within their boutique, as opposed to ambling
Senegalese hawkers and Senegalese retailers that trade over makeshift stalls. Traders only
address clients when the client is ready for purchase. Chinese shops tend to be single
rooms with concrete or wooden counters stretching from wall to wall so clients cannot
enter. They are operated by a single family and employ no more than five individuals, on
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average two or three. Chinese bosses tend to live in China, and own multiple boutiques in
Dakar run by their nephews. The outsides are curtained by hanging bundles of backpacks,
soccer balls and other toys, and hanging mannequins dressed in for-sale clothing. It is
very rare to see a Chinese person walking the streets, and the presence of Senegalese
hawkers clutters the pathways, making it very difficult to recognize the area as a Chinese
market.114

Figure 2. Chinese Market in the Centenaire, Dakar, Senegal, by Georgina Hurst

These Senegalese hawkers, known locally as tabliers, set up makeshift stalls and
mobile carts similar to those found in Sandaga Market, and sell goods directly bought or
borrowed on credit from the Chinese boutiques in the surrounding area. While the tabliers
cater to retail needs, the Chinese boutiques are for wholesale. So while a majority of
Senegalese consumers buy from Senegalese retailers, whether in the Centenaire or
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Sandaga, the goods bought are nearly always made in China.115 There is no animosity
between the Chinese boutique owners and Senegalese tabliers. The Senegalese can tell by
the behavior and appearance of the Chinese that the traders have common, modest origins
just like the Senegalese tabliers. The Senegalese also recognize that they cannot afford to
buy the boutiques the Chinese own so they are not being crowded out; in fact the tabliers
business would not exist without the presence of the Chinese. Problems do exist but there
is limited hostility between the different nationalities.116

Figure 3. Senegalese tabliers in the Centenaire Region, Dakar, by Georgina Hurst
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How have the Chinese adapted to an environment exceptionally different from
their own? To begin, the Chinese are able to exercise economic strength denied in
China’s hybrid socialist-capitalist economy by opening up their own boutiques. In Dakar,
they adapt to local consumer demand, imitating and mass-producing prayer beads,
framed pictures of Senegalese religious leaders, and traditional female pagnes and
mouchoirs. They also supply basic necessities, such as low-end electronics, hygiene
products, clothing and school supplies. By focusing production on Islamic holidays,
school and basic household needs, the Chinese merchants are able to capture a diversified
consumer base.
Senegalese consumers in Dakar’s informal market tend to be young women, and
more broadly very low-income Senegalese families unable to maintain similar standards
of living given Senegalese markets.117 Local Senegalese consumers, therefore, also
benefit. Religious holidays are expensive to prepare for, and cost of living is high.118
Therefore, with cheap Chinese goods sold locally, public purchasing power increases.
Consumers are able to effectively increase their standards of living by purchasing
previously unaffordable goods, such as consumer durables, and electronics. Glassware is
a significant example as it can be sterilized, unlike the clay and plastic cups Senegalese
markets provide in a similar low price range.119 Goods marked “Made in China”
proliferate the area, accentuating the Chinese marketing and production superiority.
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Not a ‘Chinatown’
Although the area is dominated by Chinese-owned boutiques, the Centenaire is far
from our definition of a Chinatown. In most countries, including the United States,
Chinatowns are heavily dominated by Chinese culture. Streets are dotted with Chinese
restaurants and petty boutiques selling traditional touristy Chinese goods, such as maneki
neko, silk clothing, slippers, and Chinese lanterns. It is a scene of extravagance, with
large red and gold arches, neon signs and street-wide banners in Chinese characters.
Tourists visit Chinatowns to get a feel for the culture, eat original food, and purchase
traditional Chinese merchandise. Chinatowns embody a tangible sense of community and
Chinese culture.
In Senegal, however, this is not the case. The streets are cluttered with makeshift
stalls manned by Senegalese traders, and it is nearly impossible to see Chinese traders
hidden in boutiques behind a curtain of hanging merchandise. The goods being sold are
daily essentials, from clothing to hygiene products and shoes, generally pasted with
knock-off Western brands, such as Puma, Colgate, and Toms. Restaurants are few, and
signs of Chinese culture are limited; there are no neon signs, banners, lanterns or dragons.
Despite the Chinese living almost exclusively off of food, clothing, and entertainment
imported from China, these goods are not sold in the open market. It is simply the density
of the Chinese population that encourages a perception of an overwhelming presence
when in reality the Chinese inhabitants remain minimal, and cultural implications are
minute.120
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Also, in Dakar there is little apparent sense of community among the Chinese. To
begin, there are few full families. This is partly due to concerns of cultural socialization,
fearing Chinese children will not sufficiently learn the Chinese language or culture while
in Dakar. Chinese adults returning to China after three years in Dakar do not recognize
their home anymore and feel that they do not fit in because China is growing so rapidly.
And, as previously mentioned, wives stay in China to serve as a link in the supply chain.
Chinese males therefore dominate the Centenaire, so there is limited chance of love or
new relationships. Traders work all day to make a living, have little time to socialize, and
either sit alone in a shop or with a Senegalese employee with whom they cannot
communicate. Life in Senegal is lonely for these Chinese traders.121
There are also cultural tensions and social divides. Most of the migrants in the
Centenaire are from the rural Henan region of Mainland China. Henan Chinese are
historically poor, uneducated laborers that conduct menial agricultural and service tasks
for a small income. The second largest group of Chinese in Dakar is from the Fujian
region. These individuals are of a slightly higher class and historically view those from
Henan as servants. Therefore, the Fujian competing with the Henan on the same income
level in the same market has stirred ethnic tension, and resentment towards the Henan.
This, as well as hostility deriving from jealousy and competition over rapid accumulation
of wealth, has culminated in murder in a few cases.122
Two relatively recent instances of violence include the murder of a 44-year-old
male merchant on February 20, 2009 and a 52-year-old female Chinese trader in August
2009, both found gagged and bound with their arms tied behind their backs. In the first
121
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instance, the murderer had been an employee of the female trader, and stole four million
FCFA from her. In the second, the murder(s), still unknown, stole all the goods from the
Chinese man’s shop.123
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8. Economic Implications for All Actors
The informal economy is fundamental to economic development in developing
countries around the world today.124 It is the first step into employment, where entering
the formal economy is too difficult. It helps families avoid the gravest extremes of
poverty, and aids individuals in acquiring the skills necessary to conduct and manage
business, and receive income, even if limited. While many argue the Chinese have helped
expand this critical sector of the economy in Senegal, others claim the pervasive presence
of the Chinese crowds out local entrepreneurs.
As previously mentioned, the structural adjustments of the 1980s brought about
widespread economic disaster for Senegal, from government officials to the already
unemployed. There was a significant cut in the number of officials in the administrative,
education, and health sectors, and a decline in wages for those that remained. Families
struggled to survive given their meager pensions, and many children failed and quit
school to join the workforce and help their families. The devaluation of the FCFA in the
90’s led to a rapid rise in food prices and other essentials, such as energy. For these
affected families that quickly plummeted into unemployment and extreme poverty, the
Chinese traders in the Centenaire were a blessing. To begin, the Chinese that rented
homes and boutique-space provided struggling Senegalese families with supplemental
revenue in terms of rent.125 But there are more economic implications for Senegalese
vendors and consumers.
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Economic implications for Senegalese vendors and employees
To begin, it is important to note that the impact of Chinese merchants in the
Centenaire region of Dakar is ambiguous and depends on a variety of factors that vary in
gravity between Chinese boutiques. Employment practices and wage levels are not
standardized, particularly in an informal economic setting. Therefore, in some instances
wages are higher than local businesses pay while others boutiques award lower wages
based on the season.126 Also, estimating the actual number of Chinese entrepreneurs is
extremely difficult given the somewhat clandestine and informal nature of their
migration, so contemporary statistics often contradict each other. Therefore it is difficult
to analyze the full extent of the Chinese presence on local business and society. The most
recent estimates place Chinese entrepreneurs between one and two thousand, and stores
range from 140 to 300 in the Centenaire.
Total volume of Chinese imports in Senegal remains finite around 8.5% of total
imports. While there has been a significant increase from just 2.85% in 2002, the major
rise in imports from China began before a large community of Chinese migrants
developed in Dakar. Commodity flows are therefore not directly linked to independent
Chinese migration. But it is not unjust to conclude that recent migration has some
influence on the augmentation in magnitude of commodity imports.127 Senegalese
customs officials declare 30% of commodity imports from China are strictly for personal
Chinese use and never enter the market.128
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The most important implications of the budding Chinese boutiques are the
resulting spike in Senegalese employment and the improvement of Senegalese business
practices that help maximize profits and efficiency. The Chinese in the Centenaire are
wholesalers. Their ambition is to sell in bulk to Senegalese retailers, but they do cater to
individual buyers to allow profit maximization.129 90% of profit comes from wholesales
for the Chinese. This enables cooperative competition between Chinese wholesalers and
Senegalese retailers.130 They must coexist and cooperate to make profit and maintain the
supply chain. Senegalese retailers buy cheap goods from the Chinese boutiques in Dakar
rather than traveling to China to purchase them, and sell the goods for a higher price than
they paid initially, thus making a profit. With the Chinese wholesalers a few blocks from
Senegalese small businesses in Sandaga Market and dispersed throughout Dakar,
transport costs and customs fees are absorbed by Chinese traders rather than Senegalese
traders, thus making opportunity to earn higher profits a reality. In this way, the
Senegalese are able to fight poverty in entering the informal market by way of the
Chinese wholesalers.131
The Senegalese are able to retail the goods at higher prices than offered in the
Centenaire due to consumer preferences and loyalties, and unfortunate racism against the
Chinese that is perpetuated by the media. Senegalese low-income consumers would
rather purchase goods from trusted Senegalese relatives and friends than from the
Chinese.
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The Chinese wholesalers provide a more efficient marketplace, and greater
employment opportunities to undereducated Senegalese entrepreneurs unable to enter the
formal market. Senegalese youth are hired to serve menial tasks in the boutiques, from
security to translation and customer services. Although there is no job security or set
wages, employment for these uneducated, low-income youths is unmatched elsewhere in
Dakar. Also, with the Chinese wholesalers in the Centenaire, Senegalese retailers are able
to purchase the same goods they used to have to travel to China to purchase. Now,
Senegalese retailers have a more consistent local supply of goods at cheaper cost, and do
not have to worry about customs fees or transportation costs. This significantly decreases
barriers to enter the informal market, as Senegalese entrepreneurs no longer have to fund
a roundtrip plane ticket to China. Therefore, more Senegalese entrepreneurs with limited
capital are able to find employment in Dakar’s informal economy.
The Chinese have developed effective methods of comprehending consumer
patterns of behavior, which the Senegalese have not yet mastered.132 In recording
inventory, tracking high selling seasons, noting what is in and out of fashion, and in
establishing a lower initial price in haggling rather than pushing the highest possible rate,
the Chinese can pointedly target consumers much more efficiently than the Senegalese
that live on day-to-day profits. These specialized skills are transferable, and they are the
key to success in a globalized economy. Senegalese business tactics will improve as a
consequence of engaging in business with the Chinese traders.133
Not all ramifications are positive for the Senegalese informal market. The Chinese
wholesalers in Dakar provide merchandise for Dakar’s retail trade. Therefore, Dakar’s
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retail trade is determined by Chinese retail supply.134 With fewer and fewer Senegalese
having to travel to China and develop business relations with Chinese manufacturers and
suppliers, the Senegalese retailers are becoming more heavily reliant on the Chinese
physically present in Dakar for the goods they sell.
Also, aside from essentials, the Chinese traders also sell imitation Senegalese
goods that Senegalese traders make by hand, such as beaded jewelry and leather sandals.
In order to make a high enough profit to offset opportunity costs, the Senegalese must
charge prices higher than the Chinese offer given Chinese cheaper inputs. Therefore,
Chinese inexpensive and varied products peal low- and medium-income consumers away
from local entrepreneurs, forcing Senegalese vendors to adopt competitive pricing
strategies that lead to profit loss and ultimate exit from the market.135 Shoes are one of
these trades. Once favored by regional kings, pointy-toed leather slippers are now a staple
in Senegalese households. The shoes are handmade in a town called Ngaye Mekhe,
located in northern Senegal and known locally as Senegal’s shoe capital. Requiring
significant manual labor and skill, and high quality leather, a pair of shoes costs nearly
US$20. The Chinese recognize the high demand, and mass-produce replicated versions of
the shoes in lower cost plastic, selling them for US$5. This aids the gradual demise of the
traditional handcrafted business.136
But it is important to note that the Senegalese initiated this process of imitating
traditional Senegalese handmade goods and mass-manufacturing them in China to take
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advantage of cheaper production costs and resulting ability to sell the products for
cheaper in Dakar. The Chinese picked up on this, and moved to Senegal to provide a
more direct supply of merchandise, and capitalize on their manufacturing superiority.137
Therefore the issue is not the presence of the Chinese but rather than availability of a
global value chain. Imitation was inevitable regardless of the Chinese migrants in Dakar.
Many Senegalese have also established strong supply networks directly with
Chinese manufacturers in China that are too costly to abandon. The local provision by
Chinese wholesalers of the same goods these Senegalese pay large sums to import from
China force Senegalese retailers to shut down.
Next, the Senegalese are on average a deeply religious people, with 94% of the
population practicing Islam. Therefore, they close markets on Sundays to enjoy a day of
rest. The Chinese, on the other hand, are strictly in Dakar for economic purposes, and
stay open seven days a week. This extra day of business gives the Chinese an advantage.
Ultimately there are some negative implications for the Chinese presence in
Dakar, but the gains in expanded employment opportunities and cheaper prices exceed
the relatively minimal losses.
Economic implications for Senegalese customers
The actual number of Chinese residents in Dakar relative to the Senegalese is
minimal. But their tightly compacted existence in the Centenaire, as well as the
proliferation of Made in China goods throughout markets and homes in urban and rural
Senegal give the impression of Chinese ubiquity. This has catalyzed many negative
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conceptions of and prejudices against the Chinese in Dakar. Although unproven, locals
claim Chinese toys contain toxic substances, and because prices are so low, Senegalese
low-income consumers are forced to purchase these unhealthy goods.138 But, the
Senegalese retailers catering to the low-income locals provide the same Chinese goods.
Admittedly, the quality of the Chinese goods is poor. But Senegalese consumers
actually demand this poor quality, as do Senegalese suppliers. With nearly half of
Senegal’s population unemployed and the majority living below the poverty line, lowincome consumers are more interested in subsistence and minimizing cost than in
maximizing the quality of the goods they buy. With the proliferation of inexpensive
Made in China goods throughout the market, impoverished Senegalese can achieve a
higher standard of living. In this way, the Chinese democratize consumption, making a
greater variety of goods available at lower cost to a wider consumer market. Senegalese
retailers also demand the Chinese import lower quality commodities so that those who
maintain expensive supply chains directly with China can continue to effectively compete
in the same market. The Chinese therefore adapt to the low purchasing power of the
Senegalese, hence providing lower quality ‘rubbish’ goods.139
Implications for Chinese Merchants in Dakar
Unfortunately for the Chinese, life in Senegal is neither easy nor enjoyable. The
Chinese work so hard to make a living and support their families in China, there is little
time to make friends and engage in social life. They lead a very lonely existence and
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remain strictly to make large profits and gain enough capital to continue on to Europe, or
return to China. Thus, the Chinese temporarily sacrifice happiness for money.140
Cost of living and conducting business in Dakar is high, even for the Chinese
merchants. To begin, the Senegalese government has caught on to the large influx of
foreign commodities in recent years, and consequentially customs feeds have risen
considerably. Although not explicit, this motion has targeted Chinese merchants the most.
Additionally, the Chinese pay above-market prices for renting shops and homes.141 Their
presence is often seen as a threat, and this clearly has led to economic sanctions against
them, whether direct or indirect.
The number of Chinese merchants in Dakar cannot be known with certainty, but
hovers around one thousand individuals. The number of French inhabitants peaked at
30,000 and the Lebanese today probably far exceed that. Furthermore, it is harder today
for the Chinese to penetrate the market compared with the French. The French owned
mercantile monopolies and enjoyed imperial discrimination from a French-controlled
government. Today, the Senegalese government is sovereign, and the Chinese have next
to zero involvement in local politics. Therefore, the Chinese presence is minimal
compared to past migrant communities, and relative to the 2.5 million Dakar inhabitants,
thus the implications are not as negative as sources claim.142
Local Reactions
But tensions do exist. In July 2004, a local Senegalese trade union UNACOIS
(Union nationale des commerçants et industriels du Sénégal) staged a protest against
140
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Chinese petty merchants in the Centenaire, accusing them of not respecting the law by
participating in bribery, tax evasion and importation fraud. UNACOIS strongly believes
the Chinese pollute low-income family households with valueless and dangerous items
whereas the Senegalese import essential Chinese products, such as furniture.143
UNACOIS demands the Senegalese government become involved. Extremists even
demand a complete expulsion of all Chinese merchants from Dakar in an effort to
reestablish the old economic order. Since 2004, there have been a series of other protests
staged by UNACOIS as recently as 2011, but with limited success.144
L’Association des consommateurs du Sénégal (ASCOSEN) which seeks to
educate, inform and protect consumer interests, staged a counter-protest in 2004 asserting
UNACOIS is racist and xenophobic towards the Chinese. They note that the Chinese are
actually not that different from the Senegalese retailers. Senegalese merchants cheat
customers with grossly inflated prices. The Chinese, on the other hand, increase the
standard of living by diversifying consumption at lower cost to consumers.145 They
contend that the goods Chinese sell are no more dangerous than the goods the Senegalese
offer as a majority of the merchandise sold by Senegalese retailers comes from the same
source. ASCOSEN also points out that by definition the informal sector activity is outside
the fiscal reach. Therefore the Chinese do not engage in a higher level of tax evasion and
informality than the local Senegalese retailers in Sandaga Market.146 And, although not
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directly consumer related, ASCOSEN claims the Chinese provide jobs directly and
indirectly for the Senegalese, and provide and alternative for employment where the
government cannot.147
Essentially, ASCOSEN regards UNACOIS’s aggression towards the Chinese as a
human rights issue violating international consumer rights. Consumers have a right to
access basic goods available in a given market and their choices must be respected and
protected, as a United Nations principle established in 1986 declares. In 2004,
ASCOSEN, in collaboration with various local human rights and consumer rights
organizations,148 initiated a movement to protect Senegalese consumer liberties and
entitlements against UNACOIS’s hostile measures targeting Chinese merchants in Dakar.
Together, they contended that aggression towards foreigners would lead to social
imbalance with potential catastrophic consequences. It would also question how
international law applies to Senegal’s freedom of trade, freedom of competition and
freedom of establishment. Lastly, ASCOSEN asks that the government protects
consumers in stating, “We ask the Senegalese authorities competent in the matter to be
vigilant, to resist commercial terrorism, to refuse blackmail and to be intransigent
towards any attitude that may be a source of division for the Senegalese people”149
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Aside from trade union resistance, the Chinese have also suffered from prejudicial
assertions due to their high visibility and rumors that the media and critics use to create
anti-Chinese sentiment. The media present reality as interest-led, and win-lose as
opposed to win-win.150 The most common claim is that the Chinese have endangered
thousands of Senegalese by feeding the market and thus the population with poor quality
goods, and engaging in tax evasion and bribery.151 Secondly, critics say the Chinese
invade local markets, jeopardizing indigenous businesses. This is seen as a human rights
issue and a violation of local labor laws. The Chinese remain an isolated community,
importing everything from food to clothing and games. Their unwillingness to engage in
Dakar’s social life is often interpreted as intended invisibility and living in secret.152
There has been much speculation over how poor Chinese traders from rural
Henan are able to afford the cost of transportation to Senegal, on top of paying customs
fees and rent up to five times above-market rates. Locals suspect money laundering and
illicit activities such as prostitution and boutiques serving as drug fronts. The Chinese
provide the explanation of guanxi. The traders function through tight family networks
that involve investing and saving enough money to sustain business, which requires
importing Chinese labor. An extensive nexus of kin accrue enough wealth together to
invest in a new employee, and pay for a plane ticket to Senegal.
The Chinese Embassy in Dakar has also reacted to the inundation of the market
with Chinese merchants. In response to UNACOIS protests, Chinese merchants contacted
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the Embassy for help and security amid high tension. The Embassy did little in response,
fearing the merchants tarnished China’s prestigious image and reputation in Senegal.153
How has the Senegalese government responded to all of this? Basically, officials
appear rather helpless. The federal government has done little to address issues of
extreme poverty and incorporating the informal sector into the economy. It is not an easy
process, and starts with education reform and improved access to healthcare and other
basic needs. So it seems the government is, in a way, grateful for the presence of the
Chinese and the economic opportunities the entrepreneurs have provided for an otherwise
unemployable group of Senegalese. The government cannot, at this point, provide an
alternative to the opportunities presented by the Chinese and therefore have done little to
address the complaints of UNACOIS. The Senegalese government is also thankful for the
real estate boom that follows Chinese migration. The US government plans to aid this
formalization of the market in the near future, working alongside recently elected
Senegalese President Macky Sall. On his list of concerns are increasing employment
opportunities for Senegal’s young, entrepreneurial population. For the time being,
however, Senegalese politicians seem stuck with the status quo.154
Future of “Chinatown” in Dakar?
Given the economic implications and local reactions to the presence of Chinese
traders in Dakar, Senegal, what is the future of the Chinese market? As Professor Babacar
Gueye would say, “the Chinese never die.”155 Here he suggests that as soon as one
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Chinese merchant leaves Dakar, another takes its place seemingly immediately, giving
the impression of immortality. But the market is already oversaturated, with nearly every
Chinese boutique and newly developed Senegalese boutiques sprouting on adjacent
alleyways selling the same items. Consequentially, it is highly unlikely that Centenaire
market will expand in terms of the number of boutiques and merchants. Due to
oversaturation, profits margins are slimmer and competition is gradually intensifying.156
The Chinese market in the Centenaire will not completely disappear anytime
soon, but there are already signs of decline. It is difficult to sell off stock quickly, and it
takes about a year to do so. But there is already evidence of Chinese merchants migrating
to less competitive markets. Dakar is often a stepping-stone for Chinese entrepreneurs
looking to capitalize in non-competitive markets. It is easy to sell inexpensive lower
quality goods where there is a large supply of low-income consumers demanding them.
Thus, many Chinese have traveling to countries surrounding Senegal, such as the
Gambia, Mali and Mauritania. But the real profit is made in Europe, where instead of
boutiques in a developing country, Chinese invest in larger shops targeting higher-income
clientele and gain exposure to more important technical and business skills.
Therefore, diminishing profit margins due to overcrowding of Senegal’s informal
market, as well as better economic opportunities abroad is leading to the gradual decline
of the Chinese presence in the Centenaire region of Dakar, Senegal. But it will be
decades before the market is completely eliminated. In the long run, Senegalese retailers
have already benefited from the Chinese presence and adapted to new business practices
that make for a more efficient market.
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Statistics and Data
Statistics regarding Chinese immigration to Senegal are often speculative, with no
clear evidence as to how researchers reached their conclusions. With rapid migration,
often undocumented through informal social networks, it is very difficult to track and
calculate Chinese migrants. It is also often the case that the media and Chinese critics
inflate numbers to make Chinese appear a greater threat. Senegalese official data
collection of migrants is limited.157
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9. Conclusion
As shown in previous chapters, China serves as the primary provider of
substantial foreign development aid and investment in Africa with the ulterior motive of
acquiring access to necessary raw materials, of which many African nations are well
endowed. As a result, trade between the two powers has soared. The most recent figures
value China-Africa trade at over $200 billion, with an upward sloping trajectory.158
But Senegal’s relationship with China serves as an anomaly, attracting significant
investment and aid, but without the benefit of having a rich natural resource base. The
principal means of urban employment in Senegal is the informal sector. Many Chinese
entrepreneurs have easily infiltrated the markets of Dakar, with cheap goods and low
production and transportation costs that serve to increase Senegalese consumer surplus
and employ Senegalese entrepreneurs, despite literature that states the contrary. Despite a
widely held perception that the Chinese are engaging in neocolonial behavior, over the
past two decades, informal networks have developed through which young Chinese
entrepreneurs have migrated to Senegal in hopes of benefiting from capitalist ventures.
My firsthand research asserts that Chinese entrepreneurs in Dakar’s informal economy
are not connected with broader federal Chinese interests and thus act independently of
supposed imperialistic pursuits.
What this thesis has proven through extensive literature-based and in-field
research is that while there are advantages and disadvantages to the expanding presence
of Chinese merchants in Dakar, the gains outweigh the losses for all players in the
Senegalese informal market: consumers and retailers. Further, this phenomenon is not
specific to China and Senegal, but rather is a natural development of the push of migrants
158
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from oversaturated markets to less competitive markets abroad, and the migrants’ success
due to supply and demand of goods and labor.
Senegal’s informal sector is its largest employer, and is thus significant in the
lives of poor, uneducated Senegalese. The petty Chinese merchants in Dakar have helped
expand this sector by introducing wholesale imitation products with more variety and at
lower cost than previously available to low-income local consumers. As a result,
Senegalese retailers buy these goods in bulk, and resell them amongst the low-income
Senegalese consumer market. The Chinese have filled a niche previously nonexistent in
Senegal: that of a cheap wholesaler. As we have seen, the Senegalese retailers in the
Dakar informal market have generally shifted their merchandise from handmade crafts to
highly demand manufactured goods according to economic trends of supply and demand.
A majority of Senegalese merchants purchase these cheap manufactured goods from
China, where costs are lower than those offered in nearby Europe or the United States.
But with the immediate introduction of these same goods in Dakar by Chinese persons,
Senegalese merchants can purchase these products without facing the same steep
transport costs or middleman fees. The Chinese merchants are in a different area of the
market than the rest of Senegalese vendors. They directly cater to the needs of Senegalese
merchants by selling in bulk, while the Senegalese then sell retail, singular products to
individual customers. The Senegalese are entrepreneurial people with motivation and
ambition. Chinese merchants have provided an opportunity for the Senegalese to selfexploit this spirit.
Admittedly, there are still downfalls to the presence of low-cost foreign goods
that damage certain members of Dakar’s society. Consumers, for instance, face higher
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health risks due to poor quality goods with lead components, and choking hazards in toys.
The poor quality also induces the constant repurchase of goods as they deteriorate much
faster than higher quality, yet more expensive, European manufactured products. But this
is largely speculation based on Western standards of consumerism. The low-income
Senegalese population sheds a different light on the phenomenon. Frequent re-purchasing
of goods simulates greater wealth, as families are regularly changing wardrobes and toys.
Aggregate cost is still less than or equivalent to purchasing European-produced similar
goods of higher cost. Thus the Chinese merchants indirectly provide an opportunity for
upward social mobility amongst local consumers, whether assumed or real. The cheap
prices also allow low-income families to purchase formerly inaccessible necessities, such
as school supplies and furniture that increase standards of living.
Imitation products steal jobs from Senegalese entrepreneurs that hand-make the
goods being imitated, such as wooden prayer beads, leather sandals and shoes, and woven
bracelets. While this is true, the Chinese entrepreneurs in Dakar are not the initial
perpetrators of this. Evidence suggests entrepreneurial Senegalese retailers took the
designs to Chinese manufacturers in Mainland China and had them produced with
cheaper products decades ago. Chinese superior manufacturing capacity has enabled
China to dominate the global cheap goods market. Entrepreneurs around the world have
latched on to this opportunity to buy low and sell high in order to make a profit more
simply. The problem flattening local cultural production is not the presence of the
Chinese but the availability of the global value chain. Chinese migration and its
associated economic networks have simply lowered the cost of bringing these goods to
the Senegalese market. The knock-off mass-produced goods would have appeared in any

Hurst

77

case. Migrant networks lowered costs; the imitation goods competing with traditional
suppliers were available from other sources.
The Chinese example in Senegal is not unique. It follows a developing trend of
economic liberalization and globalization that has provided a means for global
entrepreneurs to pursue opportunities within a capitalist context. The relationship
between immigration and the informal sector of the economy is centuries old, even within
Senegal. Overcrowding of domestic markets causes individuals to leave in search of
markets facing less competition. These immigrants are likely to fill positions that have
minimal cultural, language or local knowledge requirements, hence why informal
employment is most common.
The thesis argued throughout is important in providing a positive contrasting view
to contemporary literature that tends to demonize the Chinese presence in Dakar and
exaggerate the negative economic implications. Sources claim the Chinese conquer the
informal market, forcing widespread unemployment and sickness due to poor quality
goods. This thesis, however, proves that while unemployment is a byproduct of the
Chinese presence, it is minimal relative to the expansion of employment opportunities for
poorly educated Senegalese entrepreneurs otherwise unable to enter the informal market.
Demand for poor quality goods allows Chinese producers to manufacture commodities at
cheaper cost, therefore selling them at lower prices. More low-income Senegalese are
able to purchase these goods as a result. There is also no official proof of definitive health
implications from the poor quality goods either. A proper understanding of the Chinese
presence is essential in resolving conflict, such as the extreme racism and recent anti-
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Chinese protests. Fact-based public opinion is vital in legitimizing policy debates and
political choices.
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Appendix A
Aerial Map of Sandaga Market

Aerial Map of Chinese Merchants, Centenaire
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Pictures in Centenaire Region of Dakar159

School supplies, clothing, and electronics

Low-end consumer toys

159

Senegalese retailers in Centenaire

All photographs taken by Georgina Hurst unless otherwise noted
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Senegalese tabliers in the Centenaire region

Cantine chinoise avec un jeune employé, by Amadou Diop
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Pictures from Sandaga Market

Handcrafted basketry, by Wendy Hurst

Handcrafted beaded jewelry, by Tod Spedding

Chinese-made sneakers, purses, and bags in Sandaga, by Adama

Hurst

92

RAW Materials Company: Boulevard du Centenaire Made in China
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Conference: Interactions sud-sud et globalisation: migrants chinois en Afrique et
migrants africains en Chine
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Appendix B
Table of Goods Sold in Each Market
Market Location
Type of Goods Sold
Chinese in the Centenaire
African Marabouts Portraits
Region
Colored, black and white, gold frames, laminated,
pocket-size to poster-size
Textiles, Clothing & Footwear
Bras, sneakers, belts, dresses, socks, jeans, sneakers,
plastic sandals, t-shirts, business attire, traditional
Senegalese clothing (pagnes, mouchoirs)
Household Goods
Soap, fans & air conditioning units, perfume, bags
(back packs, purses, satchels), glue, hygiene products
Entertainment
Plastic toys, soccer balls, headphones, electronics
Sandaga Market
Textiles, Clothing & Footwear
Traditional wax fabric, hand-made leather sandals,
spadri, Chinese-made sneakers and plastic
manufactured sandals, touristy t-shirts, Muslim hats,
sunglasses; others identical to those sold in
Centenaire
Household Goods
Ataaya glasses, teapots, cooking supplies
School Supplies
Backpacks, secondhand books
Artwork
Beaded jewelry, silver bracelets, hand-woven
basketry, sand art, wood sculptures and masks
Fresh food
Locally grown vegetables, meat, fish, spices, sugar
Miscellaneous
Toys, soccer balls, cell phone credit, electronics,
headphones, marabouts portraits, prayer beads
Analysis Prices of goods in Centenaire range from five to ten times
cheaper than those sold in Sandaga Market
“Made in China” printed on all products
Senegalese retailers complain about Chinese yet buy their
goods to resell, claim they are from Europe or the US
Sandaga Market is retail-oriented, and largely targets
tourists while Chinese merchants are wholesalers. In
this way, some Senegalese retailers are insulated from
Chinese wholesale manufacturing competition
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